The aim of the research was to conduct a cryptographic analysis of an encryption scheme developed on the basis of nonpositional polynomial notations to estimate the algorithm strength. Nonpositional polynomial notations (NPNs) are residue number systems (RNSs) based on irreducible polynomials over GF(2). To evaluate if the algorithms developed on the basis of NPNs are secure, mathematical models of cryptanalysis involving algebraic, linear and differential methods have been designed. The cryptanalysis is as follows. A system of nonlinear equations is obtained from a function transforming plaintext into ciphertext with a key. Next, a possibility of transition of the nonlinear system to a linear one is considered. The cryptanalysis was conducted for the cases with known: 1) ciphertext; 2) plaintext and the related ciphertext; 3) plaintext file format; and 4) ASCII-encoded plaintext.
Introduction
Algorithms and methods developed on the basis of nonpositional polynomial notations (NPNs) are also known as nonconventional [1] [2] [3] . When considering a classical notation in residue number system (RNS), positive integers are chosen as a base system, where a positive integer is represented by its remainders (residues) of dividing by the base system [2, 4] . RNS construction relies on the Chinese remainder theorem. According to the theorem, a representation of a number as a sequence of remainders is *Corresponding Author: Nursulu Kapalova: Institute Information and Computational Technologies Almaty, Kazakhstan; Email: Kapalova@ipic.kz Dilmukhanbet Dyusenbayev: Institute Information and Computational Technologies Almaty, Kazakhstan; Email: dimash_dds@mail.ru unique providing that bases are pairwise relatively prime. As distinct from classical RNSs, irreducible polynomials over GF (2) that is binary polynomials serve as bases in NPNs [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] .
Based on NPNs, nonconventional algorithms for encryption, digital signatures and cryptographic key exchange have been developed [3, [7] [8] [9] . This paper is concerned with an investigation of the strength of a nonconventional encryption scheme against cryptanalysis. The core of the algorithm under study is as follows.
First of all, an NPN is formed with its working bases
consisting of chosen irreducible polynomials
over GF (2) of degrees m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m S respectively. Polynomials (1) subject to their arrangement constitute a certain base system. All bases are to be different including the case when they have the same degree. The working range of the NPN is specified by polynomial (modulus)
P(x) = p 1 (x)p 2 (x) · · · p S (x) of degree m = ∑︀ S i=1 m i . Therefore, a message of length N bits could be interpreted as a sequence of remainders α 1 (x), α 2 (x), . . . , α S (x) of dividing a polynomial F(x) by working bases p 1 (x), p 2 (x), . . . , p S (x) respectively:
F(x) = (α 1 (x), α 2 (x), . . . , α S (x)).
2. Encryption of a message of length N bits is performed with a key sequence of the same length, which is interpreted as a sequence of remainders β 1 (x), β 2 (x), . . . , β S (x) of dividing some other polynomial G(x) by the same working bases of the system: G(x) = (β 1 (x), β 2 (x), . . . , β S (x)),
where
) is the result of multiplying polynomials (2) and (3). Members of residue sequence
are then remainders on dividing products α i (x)β i (x) by respective bases p i (x):
The binary form of ciphertext H(x) represents the sequence of consecutive coefficients of polynomials ω 1 (x), ω 2 (x), . . . , ω S (x). 4. Decryption of cryptogram H(x) with a known key G(x) for each β i (x) represents evaluation of a reciprocal (inverse) polynomial β −1
i (x) under the following condition:
The result is polynomial
The original message then could be calculated according to (4) and (5) through remainders of the following congruence:
Hence, the complete key of a message of length N bits in the above model of encryption scheme is comprised of the chosen system of polynomial bases
) obtained while generating a pseudo-random sequence, and inverse key
S (x)) calculated according to expression (5) .
To evaluate the scheme reliability, it was derived a formula of cryptostrength taking into account all possible choices of secret parameters of the scheme. Cryptostrength of the encryption scheme based on NPNs is determined by all possible but distinct from each other choices of complete keys that is secrecy thereof. Cryptostrength of encryption of a message of a given length N bits can be deduced from a formula [5] :
If an encryption scheme and at least one pair of plaintext and ciphertext have been known to a cryptanalyst, then a natural way for analysis is straightforward enumeration of all possible keys. The attack is conducted successively as long as encryption with a sample key coincides with the known ciphertext. Formula (7) determines the maximum possible number of attempts to find the right secret key. Such analysis technique is variously known as full enumeration method [10] , brute force technique [11] or exhaustive method [12] . This paper represents results of some cryptographic attacks applied against the abovementioned encryption scheme.
Some methods of cryptographic attacks
Cryptanalysis associates with such characteristics of cryptosystems as evaluation of cipher reliability and development of breaking methods thereof. Analysis of reliability is based on the assumption that a cryptanalyst possesses all the information about the cryptographic algorithm in use while the key for a certain message is unknown (Kerckhoffs' principle). 1. All possible attempts to break the algorithm; 2. Analysis of the decrypting algorithm complexity; 3. Estimate of the cipher statistical security.
In the first instance, much depends on qualification, experience and intuition of a cryptanalyst as well as a proper estimate of capabilities of algorithm originators. It is generally believed that a cryptanalyst has knowledge about the cipher structure, abilities to study the cipher and some characteristics of plaintext such as message themes, patterns, standards, formats and so on. In the second instance, the estimate of cryptostrength is substituted with the estimate of minimum complexity of a breaking algorithm. However, in general it does not seem possible to obtain rigorously provable estimates of the lower bound of complexity of different algorithms. Complexity of computational schemes can be evaluated by the quantity of computational primitives with due regard to the cost thereof. This quantity generally must have a strict lower bound and fall outside performance limitations of state-of-the-art computer-based systems. In the third instant, an assumption is that a reliable cryptosystem from the standpoint of cryptanalyst represents a black box, where input and output information sequences are mutually independent while the output ciphered sequence is pseudorandom. For the purposes of cryptanalysis the following methods are also used [12]:
-Ciphertext only attack; -Attack based on plaintexts and resulting ciphertexts;
-Chosen plaintext attack (possibility to choose a plaintext to encrypt); -Adaptive chosen plaintext attack.
The goal of the ciphertext only attack is to find as many as possible plaintexts corresponding to available ciphertexts that is to find a key, which was used for encryption. However, the given attack type is the weakest as well as inconvenient.
When performing the attack based on plaintexts and resulting ciphertexts there are two alternatives for the statement of the problem: 1) to find the key that was used to transform a plaintext into ciphertext; and 2) to build an algorithm capable to decrypt any message encrypted with that key. Plaintexts are of crucial importance in the attack. They could be retrieved from a variety of sources. This attack is more powerful as against the ciphertext only attack.
The main difference between the just mentioned attack and the chosen plaintext attack lies in the possibility to choose a number of plaintexts and further to encrypt them with the searched key. This makes the latter attack more powerful.
The adaptive chosen plaintext attack is applicable in cases where a cryptanalyst has an access to the encryption device. This type of attack is also widely used to break public key cryptosystems. To perform the attack, methods of differential and linear cryptanalysis are of frequent use.
Differential cryptanalysis was put forward by E. Biham and A. Shamir in 1990. This approach represents a chosen plaintext attack. Diversity measure variation of two plaintexts during main phases of cryptographic transformation was considered as the basis for the analysis. The Hamming distance serves as a diversity measure for two binary vectors. The Hamming distance between two strings of equal length is the number of positions at which the corresponding symbols are different. To perform differential cryptanalysis successfully it is required a large set of plaintexts and resulting ciphertexts [13] .
Linear cryptanalysis was proposed by Japanese mathematician Matsui in 1993. The method again represents a known plaintext attack. The method uses linear approximations assuming with a certain probability that there is a linear dependence between plaintext, relating ciphertext and key bits. The scheme of linear cryptanalysis is implemented in two steps. The first step implies building linear relations involving plaintext, ciphertext and key bits, where the relations are likely true. The second is to use these relations in conjunction with known plaintextciphertext pairs to derive key bits [14] . Both differential and linear cryptanalyses for a significant period of time were based on statistical approaches. As noted above, to perform the attack it is needed a large set of plaintexts and related ciphertexts. Besides, modern encryption schemes were developed with due consideration of resistance to attacks of this nature. Relevance of algebraic methods of cryptanalysis rests upon the possibility of breaking through them encryption schemes given merely one plaintext-ciphertext pair. It is also of importance that the methods are applicable to strong modern cipher systems. Algebraic attacks make use of internal cipher structure that is to obtain an encryption key it is necessary to represent enciphering transformations in the form of a set of multidimensional polynomial equations, and subsequently to solve the system [11] .
Literature Review
One of challenges facing modern cryptography is building a general theory of encryption strength validation. Existence of a variety of cryptanalysis methods coupled with emergence of new lines of research in the area calls for continuous literature analysis. When it concerns the topic of this paper, it could be mentioned the following works. Books [10, 11] consider basic techniques of cryptanalysis in details. The task to break a certain cipher is solved on a case-by-case basis, though methods of solution thereof have some common features allowing bringing together various attacks and developing cryptanalysis methods. The use of mapping preserving algebraic structures (homomorphisms) is a standard method to solve mathematical problems. It is generally used embedding of an algebraic structure into an enveloping structure or homomorphism of a larger structure into a smaller one. Publications [11, 15] provide results of algebraic cryptanalyses. If an enveloping algebraic structure opens the way to new properties, then the former approach consisting of two steps is applied. The first step implies extending a cryptographic algorithm on an enveloping set enabling simplification of key breaking by means of the new properties and developing a method of key breaking for the extended cryptoalgorithm. The second step involves parameterization of the developed method of key breaking with the data specific to the original (non-extended) cryptoalgorithm, and further finding the answer of the problem. The latter approach is used straightforwardly to decrease the complexity of the problem by shrinking. Here, the problem is split into subproblems to solve them oneby-one. In article [16] , a new cipher named Baby Rijndael was built. The cipher represents a reduced version of Rijndael scheme with the same algebraic structure. The XL and XSL attacks on Baby Rijndael were performed to explore if the attacks could be used against AES. A system of n linear equations in n unknowns can be solved easily. The method of Gaussian elimination is a well-known algorithm to solve the problem with the running time of O(n 3 ).
Practically, there are even faster methods, depending on a system of equations. Works [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] 
In [27] [28] [29] [30] , results of attacks on algorithm RC5 are discussed. While analyzing algorithm RC5, it is possible to pursue a goal of finding either the seed secret key or extended key table. The application of the two powerful attacks of differential and linear cryptanalysis to RC5 is considered by Kaliski and Yin [28] , who show that the 12-round nominal cipher appears to be secure against both attacks. It is also shown that there are keys that make RC5 even weaker against differential cryptanalysis. Recently, in [29] , new differential cryptanalysis results imply that 16 rounds are required for the cipher with w = 32 to be secure. The results of linear cryptanalysis are refined by Selcuk in [30] , where it is shown that a small fraction of keys results in significant susceptibility to linear cryptanalysis.
Cryptanalysis of encryption scheme based on NPNs
When performing the cryptanalysis, it is believed that an encryption scheme has been known in advance. The cryptanalysis relies on two forms of information. The cryptanalyst needs to derive:
-Plaintext and a key from a ciphertext; -Secret key from a plaintext-ciphertext pair.
Before conducting algebraic and linear analyses of an encryption scheme based on NPNs, a set of equations is built subject to regularities of ring multiplication (4). This set relates to a key, plaintext and ciphertext.
Security against algebraic cryptanalysis of encryption scheme based on NPNs
Let us consider first the process of encryption for merely one irreducible polynomial. Suppose expression
describes an encryption method based on NPNs.
We write the polynomials in use as follows:
is a polynomial, where coefficients are bit sequences of a plaintext;
is a polynomial, where coefficients are bit sequences of the generated key;
is a polynomial, where coefficients are bit sequences of the resulting ciphertext; and
is an irreducible polynomial selected as a working base for modulo operations. The process of decryption for (8) is performed according to the following formula:
where β −1 (x) = d n−1 x n−1 +d n−2 x n−2 +. . . +d 2 x 2 +d 1 x+d 0 is a reciprocal (inverse) polynomial to β(x), where coefficients are bit sequences and ω(x) · ω −1 (x) ≡ 1(mod p(x)).
From expression (8) we find polynomial s(x) ∈ GF(2)[x]/(p(x)), which satisfies equation
The process of multiplication for two polynomials is as follows:
Then from (10), (11) and (12) we derive the following set of equations: 
and s = (s n−2 , s n−3 , . . . , s 2 , s 1 , s 0 ) respectively. We consider these coefficients as bit sequences of unknown variables. Set of equations (13) can be built for every working base of the encryption scheme based on NPNs. Note that the quantity of equations in set (13) is (2n − 1), while the quantity of variables in the set is (4n − 2).
Let us consider first a particular case, where the set of equations is linear. In this situation, the set (13) is free of variables k i and s i .
If a set of equations is linear and the quantity of variables in the set is twice as much as the quantity of equations, then it will have 2 n solutions. However, for each specific plaintext a = (a n−1 , a n−2 , . . . , a 2 , a 1 , a 0 ) there exists a unique solution
Let us now take a look at the general case. Considering that coefficients kn and k 0 are always equal 1 for irreducible polynomials, we can transform variables s i in set (13) into the following equations:
The general formula for the expression can be shown in a recursive form:
where i = 0, n − 2. If we plug equation (14) in the set of equations (13), then we will get n equations instead of 2n−1 ones. These n equations consist of variables d i , k i and a i . The quantity of products consisting of variables k i and d i increases rapidly in line with the degree of irreducible polynomial, yet the quantity of multipliers k i is no more than one-half of the polynomial's index. It should be also noted that the sum of coefficients is equal 1 for any irreducible polynomial (the cryptanalyst can take advantage of this property). Hence, the set (13) becomes as follows:
The set can be linearized with introduction of new variables. However, it requires a plaintext of the length not less than the number of variables obtained. Therefore, it is not possible to solve the set of equations by linearization with introduction of new variables. In this situation the quantity of values of plaintexts should be not less than the quantity of variables.
Let us now consider the case, where plaintext is unknown. The cryptanalysis problem then reduces to the key exhaustion attack. Table 1 represents the number of tries versus the key length.
Let us now discuss the case, where the cryptanalyst has a plaintext and the resulting ciphertext that is variables a i in equation (15) are known. As noted above, linearization is inefficient in this case. The solution can be found by fitting of irreducible polynomials. Substituting the values of selected irreducible polynomials in the set of equations (15), we will obtain n equations in n unknowns. A solution of these n equations is either existent or not existent. If they do not have a solution, then other polynomials of the same degree will be selected. Otherwise, using the computed solution as a key we will decipher consecutive blocks of length m bits. In the event the obtained plaintext is meaningless, we will try the next solution. Provided that the results obtained make sense, we believe that the part of key corresponding to the chosen working base has been derived and then we move to searching other parts of the key. The complexity of this approach will increase in accordance with the growth of degree of the irreducible polynomial (Table 2) .
Let us also consider the case, where extension type of the encrypted file is known. As far as the standard beginning of file is known, the set of equations can be put in the form discussed above, and similarly we can find key parts step by step. Table 3 lists starting bytes for some standard file types. These bytes can be used for deriving parts of the key. Let us finally consider the case, where plaintext represents ASCII-encoded characters of the Latin alphabet. Taking into account that each 8 th bit is zero bit, we can substitute respective bits of the plaintext for variables in the set of equations (15) and drawing them from each con- secutive block of length m to obtain a new set of equations where the right side is determined. Here the number of equations depends on the plaintext length. The number of equations is equal to the number of variables when the plaintext length is eight times as much as the key length. The resulting set of equations can be further solved in the same way as in the cases above. Higher degrees of polynomials increase substantially the number of possibilities for the search, which in turn adversely affects the effectiveness of the cryptanalysis. 
Security against linear cryptanalysis
The set of equations (13) can be linearized by substitution of multiplication of variables k i and s j with addition thereof through the truth table (Table 4) . We can check if it is possible in our situation. Substituting in equation (13) multiplication k i s j for addition k i ⊕ s j we can linearize equation (14) . Note that not all equations in (13) can be linearized. When it concerns cryptanalysis, the more linear equations we have, the better. This can be achieved as follows.
From the truth table it follows that expression xy⊕x⊕y will take on a value 1 with a probability of 3/4, while a value 0 with a probability of 1/4. Substitution of multiplication of variables x and y for addition x ⊕ y ⊕ 1 in the set of equations (13) results in obtaining of a set of linear equations.
If in an equation the number of multiplications is increased, then the probability of trueness of the equation will come close to 0.5 (Table 5 ). In the event one of multipliers in an equation is equal or likely close to 1 it is possible to build an approximate linear equation. The numbers of coefficients «0» and «1» in irreducible polynomials are close to each other; therefore it is rather complicated to obtain an approximate linear equation. Thus, linear cryptanalysis is ineffective for the algorithm under study.
Security against differential cryptanalysis
the following expression is true, since the distributive law holds for the field under consideration:
If an irreducible polynomial from working bases, a differential between plaintexts and a differential between ciphertexts are known then a statistical attack against the set of equations (13) will provide a great opportunity to reveal a part of key. The difference matrix of differential cryptanalysis of the encryption scheme based on NPNs for all irreducible polynomials (working bases) is uniformly distributed. This shows that differential cryptanalysis is ineffective for the algorithm.
Discussions
The strength of multiplication operation in the encryption scheme based on NPNs was investigated against algebraic, linear and differential attacks. It is possible to reveal a complete key making use of the algorithm scheme when considering parts of the key.
To perform a linear attack against the algorithm, it is needed first to determine the degree of polynomials or the length of key part. Differential attack does not require any necessity of the kind.
Given that the parts of key (from working bases) can be studied separately in the algorithm under consideration, the complete key is retrieved from the parts thereof. The length of complete key is determined by expression m = ∑︀ S i=1 m i , hence in each block of m bits, variables in the set of equations (13) , which was built using values of ciphertext and plaintext, are identical. In this regard, each 
